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SURVEILLE

Surveillance: Ethical issues, legal limitations, and efficiency

Collaborative Project

SURVEILLE Deliverable 3.2
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN LEVEL STUDIES ON PERCEPTIONS OF SURVEILLANCE.
NEGATIVE PERCEPTION, EFFECTS, SIDE EFFECTS AND PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS.

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Executive summary

Focus of the report

As in the SURVEILLE project as a whole, in this report we use "surveillance" to mean primarily an activity aimed at identifying hazards, typically expected to derive from human criminal conduct. This report focuses on "European" perception of surveillance, i.e. the way in which surveillance is regarded, understood or interpreted by European citizens in the European Union. Since there is no such thing as "the" perception of "the" European citizen, this report is not meant to provide definitive statements on "the" way Europeans perceive surveillance. However, taking European citizens as the focus of the research means assuming a particular perspective on surveillance. Beyond national, cultural, and personal differences, indeed, European citizens share a number of common factors that influence their perception of surveillance: on the one hand, Europe enjoys an economically and politically privileged position; on the other, the European Union traces its political normative framework back to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It is from this privileged, normatively (civil and political) rights-based stance that European citizens expressed the points of view reported here.

Main results

In the report we organise such points of view according to the relevance of perception issues in the SURVEILLE project. This is twofold. On the one hand, a negative perception is considered to be a cost of surveillance, while on the other hand, perceived effectiveness is a desired effect of surveillance technologies. As to the negative perception in general, the surveys analysed allowed us to conclude that a negative perception of surveillance in Europe is a significant phenomenon which, under certain circumstances, may concern up to the majority of citizens. We identified 12 effects and side effects of surveillance. They are connected to negative perception of surveillance in three ways: 1) they may be direct sources of negative perception; 2) they may derive from negative perception and consist of influences on people's behaviour or 3) since they may pose threats to democracy, rule of law and solidarity, they impact society and may influence perceptions of surveillance negatively. The table below reports the effects and side effects for each group.

Negative-perception related effects and side effects of surveillance

Potential sources of negative perception:	Potential consequences of negative perception:	Impact on society:
Technologies perceived as threats themselves	Self-surveillance	Control society
Security dilemma and surveillance spiral	Chilling effect	Social exclusion and discrimination
Fear of misuse (incl. function creep)	Conformism and loss of autonomy	Social homogenisation

Fear of insufficient protection of personal data		Decline of solidarity
Fear of unlimited expansion and irreversibility		

As to the positive aspects, i.e. perceived effectiveness of surveillance, we identified three ways in which perception and effectiveness relate to each other. First, there is the direct relationship between surveillance and perceived security, i.e. the question whether surveillance, independent of its actual security improvements, increases perceived security. Studies showed little evidence of a causal relationship between the deployment of surveillance technologies and a reduction in fear of crime or an increase in feelings of security. It seems therefore that feelings of safety depend less on technical factors like the installation of a CCTV system and more on other elements like the actual reduction of victimisation, familiarity with people, situations and place and the presence of other people. Second, there is the relationship between actual and perceived security, i.e. the question of whether an improvement in actual security brings about an increase in perceived security. The review of existing studies pointed out the so-called "fear of crime paradox" i.e. the discrepancy between the objective situation and the subjective feeling of security: the fear of crime seems to increase or decrease independently of crime rates. Third, there is the question of whether people think surveillance is effective, typically in reducing crime and reducing the fear of crime[1]. Most of the surveys consulted report that the majority of those interviewed do not think of CCTV as effective.

Conclusions and lessons learned

The analysis of existing studies showed that a negative perception of surveillance in Europe is a very context-dependent issue. Places and situations where they are deployed and national differences play a major role in shaping the perception of such technologies. As to the relationship between perception and effectiveness, it emerges from the studies presented here that this is a complex relationship, with no cause-consequence link between the two. Moreover, some further conclusions may be drawn as to the state of the art of European research on perceptions of visual surveillance and CCTV in particular, which might be useful for future studies. As existing studies shows, CCTV is mostly used to move or keep away "undesirables" such as beggars, street traders and migrants, rather than to combat serious crime and terrorism. However, by the way existing studies recruit their interviewees, they often indirectly exclude the population groups that are mostly addressed by CCTV surveillance. As a result, the perception of surveillance by its most often intended targets is underrepresented in the existing studies. There is therefore a need to broaden the focus of European-level research on perceptions of surveillance through a more inclusive approach.

[1] As we will see, there are many ways people may think of surveillance being effective in reducing crime. They may refer to the prevention of crimes being committed through deterrence of potential offenders as well as to the identification of offenders in the prosecution phase. See section 3c below.

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1. Introduction[2]

a) Definitions and work plan

In the SURVEILLE project, "surveillance" is defined as "targeted or systematic monitoring of persons, places, items, means of transport or flows of information, in order to detect specific, usually criminal, forms of conduct, or other hazards, and enable, typically, a preventive, protective or reactive response, or the collection of data for preparing such a response in the future".[3]

As it follows from the definition above, surveillance is defined as an activity aimed at identifying hazards, typically expected to derive from human criminal conduct. The same technologies used for surveillance purposes, however, can be, and indeed often are, used for monitoring people's actions or flows of information for purposes other than detecting criminal behaviour or even for criminal purposes. This is the case, for instance, when companies use data-analysis software for marketing aims, when CCTV cameras are used by employers to monitor their employees, or when a telephone tap is used to collect information in order to plan a kidnapping. These uses are not covered by the definition of "surveillance" reported above and, although not irrelevant in SURVEILLE, are not its focus; consequently, we will not consider them here.

In this deliverable we shall address issues related to the perception of surveillance, its effects and side effects.

At least two basic meanings of "perception" can be identified. They refer respectively to 1) the phenomenon of perceiving objects with our senses: sight, hearing, touch, olfaction, and taste and 2) to "the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted"[4]. Within the context of surveillance, it is almost exclusively this second meaning that is referred to. As we will see, perceptions of surveillance include different attitudes such as acceptance or refusal, the feeling of being safe, the feeling of being under suspicion, and so on. Each of these meanings and the way they relate to each other will be dealt with extensively in this deliverable.

Issues of perception are relevant in SURVEILLE from two points of view. On the one hand, in the technology assessment, *negative* perception is considered to be a cost of surveillance[5]. By "negative" we mean here a perception subjectively associated with

[2] The author would like to thank all those who commented on this paper and thereby contributed to its improvement: Sophie Arndt, Iain Cameron, Heather Draper, Hans-Helmuth Gander, John Guelke, Coen van Gulijk, Katerina Hadjimatheou, Jonathan Herington, Sebastian Höhn, Brian McNeill, Sabine Roeser, Martin Scheinin and Sebastian Volkmann, and all the participants to the SURVEILLE's Second Annual Forum for Decision Makers, which took place in Brussels on the 23th of September, 2013.

[3] Surveille Project Consortium, Description of Work of the Surveillance Project: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations and Efficiency', (Seventh Framework programme, European Union, 2011), p. 5.

[4] Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/perception?q=perception, last visit July, 3rd 2013.

[5] Surveille Project Consortium, Description of Work, cit., p. 4-5.

feelings such as unease, fear, annoyance etc. or influencing a person's attitude toward surveillance in a way that brings this attitude closer to criticism or rejection than it was previously. On the other hand, *positive* perception is to be addressed as perceived effectiveness of surveillance, which in turn, aside from actual effectiveness, is a desired effect of surveillance technologies.

We shall analyse the effects and side effects of surveillance by focusing on the relationships between them and perception. We will identify three groups: the first one consists of effects and side effects that may result *in* negative perception of surveillance, while the second group includes the effects and side effects that may result *from* negative perception and affect people's behaviour. The effects and side effects of surveillance comprised in the third group are more indirectly related to perception but are nevertheless relevant here. They influence society rather than individuals and share a negative impact on societal solidarity, the conditions of democracy and the rule of law. Although in a more reflective way than the effects previously mentioned, also these latter effects may operate as rationales for negatively perceiving surveillance technologies.

In the deliverable we shall also investigate the complex relationship between perception and effectiveness of surveillance. First, we will address the question of whether the very deployment of surveillance technologies, independent of the level of security improvement achieved, increases citizens' perceived security. Second, we shall examine the relationship between improvements in actual and perceived security. Finally, we will deal with the question of perceived effectiveness in the strict sense, i.e. whether the interviewees believe that surveillance achieves its objectives.

b) The subjects of perception

Perception of surveillance, as of any other object, is always situated. This means that it always presupposes not only an object but also a subject; it is always a perception *of* something *by* somebody. Moreover, the subjects do not passively receive the objects of perception, rather they actively constitute what is perceived, for they always bring their own (moral) horizons which influences the way they perceive the world[6]. SURVEILLE assumes that the subjects of perception are European citizens. Of course it is not possible to speak in abstract and general terms of "the" perceptions of "the" European citizen. However, there are some general background conditions that are common to European citizens and which may contribute to shaping their perception of surveillance. To make them explicit, it is therefore necessary to contextualise the following work.

First of all, seen from a global point of view, Europeans along with the rest of the Western world share a privileged position in terms of economic wealth and political power, which has far reaching historical roots, including European expansion into the rest of the world and its consequences: violent conquest, colonialism, exploitation. Secondly, seen from inside Europe, European societies share a normative political framework marked by the principles of democracy and the rule of law. The civil and political rights, now codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

[6] M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, 1945, 491-492; C. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge 1989, p. 3-24.

Union, are centrepieces of this political tradition. This does not mean that authoritarian tendencies and violations of human rights are alien to Europe; on the contrary, they are as much inscribed in its history as democracy and the rule of law. But on a normative level, political action should be legitimised on the basis of the values expressed by the principles of democracy and the rule of law, and those values constitute an important part of the normative background which influences European citizens' judgements about political choices.

Beyond such a common European background there are many variables that influence Europeans' perceptions of surveillance. On a national level, for instance, elements such as the history of the country (for example a past dictatorship), the level of security attained in a country, the diffusion of already existing technologies and the ways the media reports on surveillance-related issues influence citizens' attitudes toward surveillance. On a personal level the perception of surveillance may be influenced by factors such as gender, age, the level of information or misinformation and past experience with crime. Personal stances and opinions and the personal level of trust in government also shape an individual's perception of surveillance. Moreover, perception is not static and also contingent factors and occurrences like a terrorist attack and its media resonance can enormously influence people's understanding and feelings towards surveillance at a particular time[7]. Finally, perceived proximity to the sources of surveillance is also an important factor influencing attitudes towards surveillance: the higher one's identification with the group surveillance originates from, the easier its acceptance[8]. This is important to point out here because in SURVEILLE, the focus is on European citizens' perceptions of practices typically carried out by national security agencies or by private security agencies commissioned by domestic institutions[9]. So the kind of surveillance meant here is surveillance that takes place *inside* a particular community.

Although we also considered studies that interviewed not just EU-citizens exclusively, it might be reasonably concluded from their recruitment strategy that most of those interviewed are EU-citizens. Therefore the factors mentioned above may be considered to have significantly impacted the points of view on surveillance in the surveys analysed here.

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[7] For the multiple variables influencing perception see PRESCIENT D3, Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new and emerging technologies: Assessing citizens' concerns and knowledge of stored personal data, 2012, p. iv and 4-6, http://www.prescient-project.eu/prescient/inhalte/download/PRESCIENT_Deliverable_3_Final.pdf?WSESSIONID=4a58cf9a966a6979f5022efc190c7ee2, last access 24/7/2013; NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity (e-passport) in the European Union: End-user perspectives on the adoption of a controversial innovation, Journal of Theoretical and Applied Commerce Research, 1 (2006), 2, 12-35, p. 27, http://www.jtaer.com/, last access 24/7/2013; C. Bozzoli, C. Müller, Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK, European Journal of Political Economy, 27 (2011), 89-106.

[8] A. T. O' Donnel et al., Who is watching over you? The role of shared identity in perceptions of surveillance, European Journal of Social Psychology, 40 (2010), 135–147.

[9] On the increasing engagement of the private sector in the security domain and its implications see: L. Zedner, Security, London/New York 2009.

c) Methodology

The results presented here are based on the analysis of 22 (meta-) studies, including two reviews of several further empirical studies. The studies are listed in Annex 2. We selected them among a broader number (over 60) of *prima facie* relevant studies because they: a) refer (also) to surveillance as defined above; b) refer at least in part to Europe; c) made their methodology transparent to the reader, or elaborated on existing studies which did the same.

The studies are very heterogeneous in the type of questions they posed to respondents, the range of population they targeted, and the kind of surveillance they referred to, with a significant bias for visual surveillance and CCTV in particular (for the latter two aspects see Annex 3). To look for univocal, definitive results that are descriptive of a "European" perception of surveillance seems therefore to be a doomed task. This is confirmed by two recent, broad-scoped reviews of empirical studies on the perception of surveillance in Europe, both carried out in EU FP7 programmes: SAPIENT and PRISMS (for more details on these projects see the info-boxes in this page).

As a part of the review of the state of the art, SAPIENT analysed existing statistical studies on citizens' perception of surveillance. In doing that, it repeatedly states that there is no single public perception of surveillance technologies, and that positions are variable, nuanced and context-dependent[10]. As to the use of closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs), probably the kind of surveillance technology which the largest amount of perception studies refer to, the SAPIENT researchers state: "From reviewing existing studies dealing with the public's acceptance or resistance to CCTV surveillance, we do not find an overarching or common European set of concerns"[11].

Project information: SAPIENT
Supporting fundamentAl rights, PrIvacy and Ethics in surveillance Technologies,
http://www.sapientproject.eu/
SAPIENT started in February 2011 and has a duration of 36 months. It is "expected to provide strategic knowledge on the state of the art of surveillance studies, emerging smart surveillance technologies, and the adequacy of the existing legal framework" (SAPIENT Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of the Art, p. ii, http://www.sapientproject.eu/docs/D1.1-State-of-the-Art-submitted-21-January-2012.pdf).

[10] SAPIENT Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of the Art, 2012, p. ii, http://www.sapientproject.eu/docs/D1.1-State-of-the-Art-submitted-21-January-2012.pdf), p. 166 and 169, last access 24/7/2013.
[11] Ivi, p. 163.

Project information: PRISMS
PRISMS, The PRIvacy and Security MirrorS: Towards a European framework for integrated decision making,
http://prismsproject.eu/?page_id=13
PRISMS began in February 2012 and will end in July 2015. It aims to "analyse the traditional trade-off model between privacy and security and devise a more evidence-based perspective for reconciling privacy and security, trust and concern". To this purpose it will, among others, conduct "a representative, trans-European survey, including 27,000 telephone interviews to ascertain citizens' privacy and security perceptions", whose analysis is expected to be published in March 2014 (PRISMS, http://prismsproject.eu/?page_id=124).

As a preliminary study for conducting its own survey, the PRISMS Work Package (WP) 7 conducted an in-depth analysis of 20 existing statistical studies "on privacy, security, surveillance and trust with an evaluation of their reliability, shortfalls and applicability for policy-makers"[12]. Also the PRISMS report on existing surveys stresses the fact that studies on people's perception of surveillance led to contradictory findings: "In relation to public attitudes towards surveillance technologies in society, eight of the 12 surveys [considered, author's note] provide evidence that some individuals respond positively to the use of surveillance measures to help enhance their security [...]. However, our analysis illustrates that individuals' support of surveillance in the form of CCTV is somewhat contradicted by findings from other surveys"[13].

Given this background, we will structure the analysis of the negative perception of surveillance, its effects and side effects in the following two steps:

a) First, we will refer to the findings of two large-scale studies to make general statements about the percentage of people who worry about surveillance being deployed (not necessarily on themselves), and how much they worry about surveillance. The questions to be addressed in this first phase are: Is the negative perception of surveillance a relatively limited or rather more of a widespread matter? And just how negatively can surveillance be perceived? The aim of this part will be to give an idea of the scope of the problem in order to be able to better contextualise the results of the second phase. By doing that we do not intend to suggest that scope should be equated with relevance. While a widespread phenomenon can be considered relevant as such, the inverse is not true: A phenomenon could be relevant even if it affects only a small group of people. Moreover, if the group in question is a racial, religious or other minority, this may make the phenomenon even more relevant.

b) Second, we will draw attention to factors that are related to perception of surveillance in the following ways: 1) either affect perception negatively; 2) potentially derive from negative perception and result in influence on people's behaviour; or 3) through their impact on society, operate as further rationales for

[12] http://prismsproject.eu/?page_id=124, last access 24/7/2013.
[13] PRISMS D7.1: Report on Existing Surveys, 2013, http://prismsproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PRISMS-D7-1-Report-on-existing-surveys.pdf p. 135, last access 24/7/2013. Moreover, we find these statements to be an example of how vaguely a general thesis must be formulated in order to be able to condense the results of several surveys.

negative perception. The questions to be addressed here are: Why might people have a negative perception of surveillance? And, how can negative perception affect one's behaviour? Such analysis will lead to identify and describe perception-related effects and side effects of surveillance and shall refer to both surveys and literature. We will identify 12 different categories of effects and side effects of surveillance.

For the part dealing with perceived effectiveness (Section 3), few studies were available. Moreover, they focus almost exclusively on CCTV and have local character, most of them having been carried out in cities. This is consistent with the character of the crimes the installed CCTV were supposed to reduce, which are also local in character (theft, burglary, etc.).

2. Negative Perception, effects and side effects of surveillance

a) Negative perception: the dimension of the phenomenon

To address the first cluster of issues, we considered those studies to be adequate which: a) Like the other studies considered here, referred to surveillance as defined in SURVEILLE; b) had a larger number of respondents involved than merely a small sample; c) carried out interviews in a significant number of European countries and d) carried out the studies on the basis of a clear, transparent and rigorous methodology[14]. Although we shall present the main results of those studies, we will use them only to gain a rough idea of the dimension of the phenomenon and not to further calculate averages and percentages based on their results.

Only two studies met the above mentioned criteria: URBAN EYE and Flash EUROBAROMETER 225 (hereafter just EUROBAROMETER 225, for more details on both projects see the info-boxes below). Out of the six, broad surveillance-areas that can be identified (visual surveillance, dataveillance, biometrics, communication surveillance, sensors and location determination technologies) [15], the URBAN EYE and EUROBAROMETER 225 studies covered only three: visual surveillance (URBAN EYE), dataveillance and communication surveillance (EUROBAROMETER 225). This deficit might be overcome by the forthcoming PRISMS survey.

Project information: URBAN EYE
http://www.urbaneye.net
The URBAN EYE project started in September 2001 and ended in June 2004. It took an interdisciplinary perspective to study the expansion, deployment, social impact and political implications of CCTV in seven European countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway and Spain. It focused on "CCTV surveillance in both public areas and private but publicly accessible spaces such as shopping malls or railway stations"(Hempel, L., Töpfer, E.: URBAN EYE Working Paper n. 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report, p. 10). In order to investigate the social implications of CCTV, in 2003 the research team conducted street interviews with 1000 citizens in Berlin, Budapest, London, Oslo and Vienna. The interviews were based on standardized questionnaires. In addition, the URBAN EYE team conducted in-depth interviews with 30 respondents.

Although the authors of the URBAN EYE final report warn: "our findings are in formal methodological terms neither strictly representative nor comparable" [16], the main findings of the interviews may be tentatively summarised as follows.

As to the acceptance of CCTV, attitudes differ considerably depending on where the CCTV is placed and the city where the interview was carried out. At a minimum, 4.3% of respondents find CCTV in banks to be a "bad thing", while disapproval was highest regarding CCTVs

[14] To assess this last point we also relayed to the analysis carried out in PRISMS, for both of the selected studies were also considered in PRISMS.
[15] SAPIENT D1.1, cit., p. 23
[16] L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report, 2004, p. 1, http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf. Last access: 24/7/2013.

placed in clothing store fitting rooms (73% of respondents). As to CCTVs in general, the largest number of people who had critical attitudes were in Vienna (41% of respondents), while the smallest number was recorded in London (4% of respondents). As to risks connected to CCTV, 53% of respondents agreed that "CCTV footage can be easily misused"[17] and 40% "believe that CCTV invades privacy"[18].

Project information: EUROBAROMETER 225
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
The **Eurobarometer** surveys are conducted on behalf of the European Commission to monitor attitudes and perceptions of European citizens on a wide range of topics. EUROBAROMETER 225 was conducted in 2008 and consisted of interviews mainly carried out via landline-telephones. The interviews covered all the 27 member states and included about 1000 citizens from each state. The focus of the survey was on data protection, data privacy and data security but did not relate exclusively to surveillance.

According to the EUROBAROMETER 225, a majority of citizens are concerned about privacy when their personal data are held by organisations (64% of respondents). More than one third (34%) of respondents are *very* concerned. Such results, however, did not distinguish between the different types of organisations that can hold citizens' data and also refer to organisations that have nothing to do with surveillance. However, the study also provides specific information about police and local authorities, two organisations that handle citizens' data also for surveillance purposes. As to the police, there is a European average of 17% of respondents who do not trust police handling of their personal data. Also this study, like the URBAN EYE survey, shows a considerable diversity of results among the European countries: For instance, in Finland only 5% of respondents do not trust the police to handle their personal data, whereas in Lithuania the rate of mistrust reaches 49% of respondents. A European average of 29% of respondents do not trust local authorities to hold their data, with a minimum in Denmark (10%) and a peak in Lithuania (52%). As to communication surveillance, a European average of 19% of respondents would not accept, under any circumstances, monitoring internet usage to combat terrorism and 25% of respondents would not accept, under any circumstances, monitoring telephone calls for the same purpose.

As we have seen, the results of both the URBAN EYE and the EUROBAROMETER 225 survey can be used here only with caution and should not be generalized: With regard to the former, the findings were admittedly not representative, and with regard to the second, the focus of the surveys was not on surveillance. Moreover, the percentage of citizens who have a negative perception of surveillance (in the form of or depending on non-acceptance, mistrust of the surveillers, or privacy-intrusion) varies considerably depending on the context of deployment and the country of provenience. However, we think that the results presented above provide a sufficient basis to formulate the following, quite modest but sufficient for our purposes, conclusion:

Negative perception of surveillance in Europe is not a marginal phenomenon. Under certain circumstances it may concern up to the majority of citizens[19].

[17] Ivi, p. 45.
[18] Ibidem.
[19] We are not considering cases here in which the rate of citizens perceiving surveillance negatively is higher because they refer to situations that are too specific (i.e. the use of CCTV in fitting rooms) to be generalisable.

A considerable number may perceive surveillance in a *very* negative way.

b) Negative-perception related effects and side effects of surveillance

For this enquiry we will refer to both small-scale studies and literature. For selecting the studies we only considered whether they: a) referred at least in part to "surveillance" as defined in SURVEILLE and b) involved at least one European country.

The relevant effects and side effects of surveillance that emerge from the studies are related to negative perception in three ways: 1) they may be direct sources of negative perception; 2) they may derive from negative perception and consist of influences on people's behaviour or 3) their impact on society may influence the perception of surveillance negatively.

The 12 types of effects and side effects of surveillance are summarised in Annex 1, organised accordingly to the group they belong to.

1- Potential sources of negative perception

1) Surveillance technologies being perceived as threats/harassments themselves

This side effect of surveillance refers to the fact that surveillance technologies can make people feel uncomfortable even when perceived as being used properly, i.e. in conformity with the stated goals and in accordance with legal requirements.
This has to do with the fact that "surveillance technologies may interfere with various aspects of people's lives" and may be perceived as restricting people's privacy and freedom of movement[20].
Examples of this kind of side effect are reported, among others, in the study BIOMETRICS AND E-IDENTITY with regard to the proposed introduction of e-passports and by the URBAN EYE project regarding CCTV[21]. In both surveys, the deployment of surveillance is felt to invade privacy.
A slightly different variant of this side effect which surveillance may cause has to do with the feeling of being "under suspicion". On the one hand, surveillance can make people feel like a suspect *a priori*, for they may be and often are surveilled without having previously shown any "dangerous" behaviour. On the other hand, as reported by the PRISE Project[22], surveillance may make surveilled persons afraid of confirming such prejudice and being classified as "dangerous" by authorities. This time it is not on the basis of a general "presumption of guiltiness", but as a consequence of their behaviour, as it is difficult to know in advance which behaviour could be classified as suspect[23].

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[20] SURVEILLE D3.1, Report describing the design of the research apparatus for the European level study of perceptions, 2012, http://www.surveille.eu/PDFs/D3.1%20Report%20describing%20the%20design%20of%20the%20research%20apparatus.pdf, last access 24/7/2013, p. 14.
[21] NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity, cit., p. 21 and L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit., p. 8. See also M. Gill et al., Public perceptions of CCTV in residential areas : "It is not as good as we thought it would be", International Criminal Justice Review 17(2007), 304-324, p. 321.
[22] PRISE ("Privacy enhancing shaping of security research and technology", http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/index.htm).
[23] V. Pavone, M. Pereira, The privacy vs. security dilemma in a risk society. Insights from

2) Security dilemma and surveillance spiral

The security dilemma consists of security technologies increasing people's feelings of insecurity rather than making them feel safer. This may happen in two ways.

First, "the usage of surveillance technologies […] may have the effect of (over-) sensitizing people to the perception of threats and just making them feel unsafe: «The more these security strategies take effect, the greater the sensitivity to the continuing lack of security, the remaining risks and to the fact that threats have not disappeared by far»".[24] This phenomenon may take many forms, result in diffused sensitivity involving society as a whole or manifest itself in very specific circumstances. In this restricted form it may manifest itself, for instance, when the fear of crime diminishes in the places where CCTVs were installed, but increases in places where there is no video surveillance[25]. Studies carried out in the UK and in Germany also report that people worry more about crime when a CCTV system is installed, possibly because the presence of cameras make the places seem more dangerous than they were supposed to be[26].

Second, those very surveillance technologies may be perceived as sources of new risks: For instance, the fact that there are people surveilling others increases the problem of monitoring the surveillance operators[27], or the very deployment of surveillance (in combination with repressive migration laws) at borders may increase the risk of death or injury during attempts to cross these borders.

In both cases this may lead to a further side effects of surveillance: in order to compensate for increasing insecurity, more surveillance is required, which in turn may further increase insecurity. As a result, a sort of surveillance spiral is triggered[28].

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the PRISE project on the public perception of new security technologies in Spain, 2008, http://www.wiscnetwork.org/ljubljana2008/papers/WISC_2008-110.pdf, p. 22, last access 24/7/2013.

[24] SURVEILLE D3.1, cit., p. 15; quote from H. Münkler, Strategien der Sicherung. Welten der Sicherheit und Kulturen des Risikos. Theoretische Perspektiven, in Münkler, Herfried/Bohlender, Matthias/Meurer, Sabine (eds.): Sicherheit und Risiko. Über den Umgang mit Gefahr im 21. Jahrhundert, Bielefeld 2010, 11-34, p. 12-13: „Je besser diese Strategien der Sicherung greifen, desto stärker wird die Sensibilität für die fortbestehende Unsicherheit, für immer noch vorhandene und noch längst nicht verschwundene Bedrohungen."

[25] Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung in den USA, Großbritannien und Deutschland – Ein Drei-Länder-Vergleich, 2006, http://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/bitstream/handle/11858/00-1735-0000-0006-B3C4-7/lin.pdf?sequence=1, p. 87-88.

[26] D. Williams, J. Ahmed, The Relationship Between Antisocial Stereotypes and Public CCTV Systems: Exploring Fear of Crime in the Modern Surveillance Society, 2009, https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2299/4794/1/903645.pdf, last access 24/7/2013; N. Zurawski, „It is all about perceptions': CCTV, feelings of safety and perceptions of space - what the people say", Security Journal, 23 (2010), 259-275.

[27] C. Ketzer, Securitas ex Machina. Von der Bedeutung technischer Kontroll- und Überwachungssysteme für Gesellschaft und Pädagogik, 2005, http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/1861/, last access 24/7/2013, p. 36.

[28] Jonathan Herington also points out: "In surveillance the actions of the government to prevent terrorism (i.e. by surveilling email) are often interpreted by targeted communities as suspicious, so they respond defensively (by using Lavabit), which is then interpreted by the government as suspicious, so they take steps to counter (i.e. by

3) Fear of misuse, including function creep

Somehow related to the former, since this too may be derived from a perceived lack of control of or mistrust of the operators, is the fear of the misuse of surveillance.
The Synthesis Report of the PRISE Project refers to such phenomenon in its generality, affirming that "more than 60 per cent of the participants in the six countries [where the survey was carried out, author's note] believe that new security technologies are likely to be abused by governmental agencies".[29] The URBAN EYE report also shows similar findings referring to 50% of respondents who believe that "footage can be easily misused"[30]. Also the report BIOMETRICS AND E-IDENTITY refers to the perceived risk of abuse of personal information made available for e-passports[31].
A specific kind of misuse of surveillance known as "function creep" occurs when the use of a technology expands gradually beyond its original scope and purpose. Examples of function creep include: drones developed for military purposes used in civilian contexts to observe public assemblies, demonstrations and other public events[32], CCTVs installed in the retail sector for preventing theft used to monitor employees[33] or for voyeurism[34], CCTV originally intended to monitor traffic used for observing "social fringe groups"[35], dataveillance technologies developed in democratic states and then sold to authoritarian regimes to oppress political opponents[36].

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shutting down Lavabit), and so on...", Jonathan Herrington, personal comment on this paper.

[29] PRISE D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security Technology and Privacy, 2008, http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_D_5.8_Synthesis_report.pdf, last access 24/7/2013, p. 25.

[30] L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit., p. 8.

[31] NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity, cit., p. 21. For a general reference to function creep see also PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, 2012, http://www.projectpact.eu/documents-1/privacy-security-research-paper-series/%233_Privacy_and_Security_Research_Paper_Series.pdf, last access 24/7/2013, p. 94.

[32] SURVEILLE D3.1, cit., where it is also recalled that: "this phenomenon is sometimes given another name. Daniel Solove, for example, uses the concept of «secondary use» in his essay «I've got nothing to hide and other misunderstandings of privacy»: «Secondary use is the use of data obtained for one purpose for a different unrelated purpose without the person's consent», s. D. J. Solove, I've got nothing to hide and other misunderstandings of privacy, San Diego Law Review, 44 (2007), 745-772, p. 767.

[33] W. Peissl et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen der Videoüberwachung, 2011, http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/ita/ita-projektberichte/d2-2a58.pdf , last access 24/7/2013, p. 5.

[34] Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung, cit., p. 84.

[35] EPTA, ICT and Privacy in Europe. Experiences from technology assessment of ICT and Privacy in seven different European countries, 2006, http://www.ta-swiss.ch/publikationen/2006/, last access 24///2013, p. 36.

[36] This was for instance the case of Siemens Nokia selling technologies to the Iranian regime, s. PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 85.

4) Fear of insufficient protection of personal data

Similar to the previous effect but still different is the fear that personal data collected by surveillance may be not sufficiently protected from other people or organisations accessing them. Although this effect may also derive from mistrust of the operators, it differs from the previously discussed effect because it does not refer to the fear of a potential misuse by the operators; rather, it refers to their possible carelessness in allowing third parties access to the information held by them. The study BIOMETRICS AND E-IDENTITY reports on this side effect, referring to respondents worrying about possible illegal access to biometric information held by authorities for producing e-passports[37].

5) Fear of unlimited expansion and irreversibility of surveillance

A last side effect of surveillance that may influence people's perception negatively has to do with the feeling of some protective barriers falling away once surveillance technologies are introduced.

This may happen in two ways.

First, while the initial introduction of a particular technology may put up resistance, it is much easier to expand its use after overcoming initial opposition. This is distinct from function creep because there must not necessarily be a change in the function for which the technologies are used. In this first meaning this side effect is mentioned in the PACT report "Privacy and Security"[38].

Second, as reported by the PRISE project, there is the feeling that once a technology has been introduced it will be almost impossible to make it disappear again, even if it emerges that the technology is misused, ineffective, unnecessary or dangerous[39].

2- Potential consequences of negative perception: self-normalization and influences on behaviour

We shall now turn to the effects of surveillance that, potentially following from its negative perception, result in a modification of people's behaviour.

6) Self-surveillance

A common basis of these effects can be traced back to self-surveillance as the mechanism that links negative perception and behaviour. The concept of self-surveillance was developed by Michael Foucault[40] and is described by Daniel Solove as follows: "by always being visible, by constantly living under the reality that one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the effects of surveillance into themselves. They obey not because they are monitored but because of their fear that they could be watched. This fear alone is sufficient to achieve control."[41] Surveillance need not to

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[37] NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity, cit., p. 21.

[38] PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 95. The pact report, however, does not rigorously distinguish such phenomenon from function creep.

[39] PRISE D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security Technology and Privacy, cit., p. 24.

[40] M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.

[41] D. J. Solove, The Digital Person. Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, New York 2004, p. 31.

actually take place: the possibility of being surveilled is already enough to bring about obedience.
Such phenomenon is also known to psychologists, who stress that the feeling of being continuously watched can bring about changes in the psyche of the observed, who becomes "more circumspect, timorous and suspicious"[42].

7) Chilling effect

The chilling effect is defined as "the disinclination to take part in certain activities which liberal theory considers entirely legitimate, such as free association, free speech and political organisation. If one worries that such behaviour is punishable in any way, or that it draws unwanted attention to oneself on the part of authorities, one is subject to [it, author's note]"[43]. Moreover, for fear of "doing wrong", people can also withhold from helping people in need. In the words of Nils Zurawski: "people abdicate from their responsibility as soon as a camera is recording. Interviews, for example, have shown that some people are afraid of doing wrong when helping someone. Thus, they preferred not to help when under surveillance."[44]

8) Conformism and loss of autonomy

Besides refraining from engaging in some public activities as referred to above, people may also develop a tendency for conformism as a consequence of surveillance. This derives from the feeling of being "under suspicion" described above: if people know that any movement, any word might be recorded and considered "suspect", they may try to avoid any "deviant" behaviour in order to avoid attracting attention[45].
Seen from another point of view, this side effect may be described as a loss of autonomy: people under surveillance do not behave in accordance with their "own" reasons but rather in accordance to what they think they are supposed to do in order not to be sorted out as "deviant"[46].

3- Effects of surveillance on society

There is a third group of effects and side effects of surveillance which affect society as a whole rather than its individuals. Its common characteristic is the restrictive impact on the background conditions and basic principles of democracy, rule of law and solidarity.

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[42] Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung, cit., p. 82.
[43] DETECTER D 12.2.1, Quarterly Update on Technology 1, 2009, http://www.detecter.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=7&layout=blog&Itemid=9, last access 24/7/2013, p. 4.
[44] N. Zurawaski: Kameras lösen keine Probleme, ZEITonline, Available at: http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/schule/2011-11/schule-kamera-zurawski; as quoted in SURVEILLE D3.1, cit., p. 15.
[45] W. Peissl, et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen, cit., p. 10 and F. Helten, B. Fischer, Urban Eye WP 13, What do people think of CCTV. Findings from a Berlin Survey, 2004, http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp13.pdf, last access 24/7/2013.
[46] W. Peissl, Surveillance and Security. A Dodgy Relationship, 2002, http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/pdf/ita_02_02.pdf, last access 24/7/2013, p. 8-9.

Thereafter they may influence people's perception of surveillance negatively, although in a more reflective way than the effects listed above, for the negative perception derives here from the knowledge of the impact such technologies may have on our societies.
For the description of such effects we will rely more on literature than on surveys. This derives from the societal character of the effects listed here: since they do not directly impact individuals, it is less likely that they are mentioned in interviews asking about citizens' perception of surveillance rather than effects affecting individuals more immediately, like the ones listed above. As a consequence, their description is based more on scholars' elaborations than on survey results.

9) Control Society: Reversing the presumption of innocence

According to Gilles Deleuze, Western societies from the beginning of the Nineties were developing from disciplinary societies into "control societies"[47]. In such a society, different but interrelated mechanisms provide the possibility for a short-term, quick-response, continuous and unlimited control over individuals. As examples of such mechanisms, Deleuze mentions locating technologies that make information available on people's positions in open spaces at any time.
Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong elaborated on Deleuze's interpretation. In their view, in control societies, the maximisation of control over citizens is justified as a means to prevent as many offences as possible. Such an ambition of control societies to prevent offences from being committed requires a further critical change: Instead of being considered innocent until proven guilty, "everyone is assumed guilty until the risk profile assumes otherwise"[48]. These authors refer to the right to be presumed innocent in a broad, moral meaning rather than in a strictly legal way. As such, it may be understood as the right to be treated as trustworthy[49].
The maximisation of control and the reversion of the presumption of innocence have an impact on the way security is perceived in society, suggesting that everybody is a potential risk[50].

10) Social exclusion and discrimination

The risk of social exclusion brought about by surveillance is reported often in the literature, particularly in relation to visual surveillance. It is argued that visual surveillance promotes the application of categorical suspicion: controllers tend to equate whole social categories, sorted out on the basis of appearance and visible traits such as colour, clothing etc., with dangerous groups. This strengthens prejudices because it seems to confirm them and amplifies social exclusion[51].

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[47] G. Deleuze, Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle, L'autre journal, 1, Mai 1990. See also D. Kammerer, Bilder der Überwachung, Frankfurt am Main2008, p. 131-142.
[48] C. Norris, G. Armstrong, The maximum surveillance society, 1999, p. 24.
[49] See SURVEILLE D4.5: Paper on the ethical risks of surveillance technologies in prevention, investigation, and prosecution of crime.
[50] PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 95.
[51] L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit., p.7; Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung, cit., p. 79 ff.; PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 94-95; M. Apelt, N. Möllers, Wie intelligente" Videoüberwachung erforschen? Ein Resümee aus zehn Jahren Forschung zu Videoüberwachung, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolit (2011), 4, 585–593, p. 590; D. Williams, J. Ahmed, The Relationship, cit.

Although this risk is evident for visual surveillance, it may affect also other kinds of surveillance because it may occur at any time that collected data may be used to categorise people on the basis of their supposed risk potential. Digital data collected through dataveillance, for example, may lead to creating a false, high-risk profile that may, in turn, influence one's chances of finding a job and therefore again strengthen prejudices and social exclusion[52].

Studies indicate also that visual surveillance in particular may have the effect of keeping particular social groups away from places where their presence is perceived by other people as disturbing. This is the case for instance of homeless or poor people and punks in shopping malls, exclusive holiday resorts or city centres[53]. Even though the studies do not explicitly describe how surveillance performs this effect, it may happen in two ways: either through operators directly intervening and forcing people to leave, or because the very feeling of being targeted by surveillance can be enough to make "undesired" people keep away. Such effect, at least when caused by the operators' intervention, contrasts clearly with the principle of non-discrimination, as sanctioned among others in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[54].

11) Social homogenisation

This effect of surveillance derives directly from the influences on individuals' behaviour described above: the chilling effect and conformism. In the view of Daniel Solove: "Chilling effects harm society because, among other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the degree of freedom with which to engage in political activity."[55]

At the same time, conformism may lead to societal stagnation, since deviant and dissenting behaviour is considered to be an important driving force for societal change[56].

Both effects can impact democratic life and impede it from developing and flourishing.

12) Decline of solidarity

Also this last effect of surveillance is directly related to surveillance's influence on people's behaviour, in particular to the chilling effect described above.

We have already mentioned the fact that people may abstain from helping others when under surveillance because of being afraid to make mistakes. But beyond that, surveillance technologies may also induce people to delegate their responsibilities towards others to such technologies: "people no longer feel responsible for their fellow citizens as soon as surveillance technologies are installed. In other words: The fact that people tend to rely absolutely on surveillance technologies may lead to a decline in

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See also T. G.Patel, Surveillance, Suspicion and Stigma: Brown Bodies in a Terror-panic Climate, Surveillance&Society, 10 (2012), 3/4, 215-234.

[52] W. Peissl et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen, cit., p. 10.

[53] L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, The Surveillance Consensus : Reviewing the Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries, European Journal of Criminology, 6 (2009), 2, 157-177.

[54] Art. 21.

[55] J. D. Solove, The Digital Person, cit., p. 31, as quoted in SURVEILLE D3.1, cit. Both the chilling effect and its societal impact are also reported in W. Peissl et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen, cit., p 10-11.

[56] W. Peissl, Surveillance and Security, cit., p.8.

mutual responsibility and a lack of moral courage which may have serious consequences for the way people live together in a society"[57].

[57] SURVEILLE D3.1, cit.; Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung, cit., p. 75; S. Graham et al., Towns on the Television: Closed Circuit TV Surveillance in British towns and cities, 1995, Working Paper No. 50, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, http://www.ncl.ac.uk/guru/assets/documents/ewp17.pdf, last access 25/7/2013; J. Ditton, Crime an the city. Public Attitudes towards Open-Street CCTV in Glasgow, The British Journal of Criminology, 40 (2000) 4, 692-709, p. 707.

3. Perception and effectiveness

a) The relationship between perception and effectiveness

To tackle the question of the perceived effectiveness of surveillance technologies is a complex task. Intuitively, one might assume that the perceived and the actual effectiveness of surveillance are related, yet the very existence of such relationship is controversial, and even if assumed is neither unequivocal nor easy to understand.
Perceived effectiveness refers quite obviously to the question of whether people think surveillance achieves the aims it is deployed for. But these are different for different technologies, often remain implicit or are imprecisely formulated[58]. As a consequence, it is likely that people do not know the exact purposes surveillance technologies are deployed for, and so the way they perceive the effectiveness of such technologies may be accordingly affected. As we will see, most of the studies that tackled this matter considered reduction of crime and reduction of fear of crime to be the purposes of surveillance and asked people if they thought surveillance technologies achieved these aims.
Moreover, the expression "perceived" effectiveness is somehow misleading, for it suggests that there is a subjective, variable effectiveness opposed to an "actual" effectiveness which is objective, impersonal and fact-based. This is not however the case because reducing the fear of crime or, more positively yet less precisely formulated, increasing feelings of safety are just as common priorities of surveillance as reducing crime or increasing security[59]. Actual effectiveness, therefore, has to do with perceptions and feelings too: both *actual security* (crime reduction/security improvement) and *perceived security* (reduction of fear of crime/ increase of the feeling of safety) are aspects of actual effectiveness[60]. Moreover, as shown in the SURVEILLE Deliverable 3.4, also beyond the perceptive component of effectiveness, there is currently no objective, impersonal and fact based definition of effectiveness available for surveillance technologies.

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[58] The difficulties related to the task of assessing the effectiveness of surveillance technologies are explored more in detail in D3.4 „Report describing design of research methodology for assessing effectiveness of selected representative surveillance systems".

[59] The latter is a less precise formulation than the negative one because feelings of "safety" may also include economic and social aspects which are beyond the aims of surveillance. The literature does not distinguish unequivocally and rigorously between "safety feeling" and "security feeling", so both expressions are used to refer to the same phenomenon. Although attempts to clarify the meaning of "safety" have been made (see N. Möller at al., Safety is More than the Antonym of Risk, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23 (2006), 4, 419-432 and N. Möller, The Concepts of Risk and Safety, in S. Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, M. Peterson (Eds.), The Handbook of Risk Theory, Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk, Dordrecht etc. 2012) more research is needed here. This is however a task beyond the scope of this deliverable. In this deliverable we shall use the expression "safety feeling", except when we quote from authors doing otherwise.

[60] PACT D1.4 Societal Impact Report, 2012, http://www.projectpact.eu/deliverables/wp1-root-branch-review/d1.4-social-impact-report, last access 25/7/2013, p. 16.



1. Perception and effectiveness

But the matter is even more complicated and the relationship between actual and perceived effectiveness is in part a circular one. Let us illustrate this with an example. In a parking area a CCTV system is installed in order to reduce crime (say, theft of or from vehicles and assault) and to make car users feel safer when they park there (for instance in order to encourage them to use public transportation). If CCTV park users actually feel safer after the installation than before, this may indicate that CCTV *is* effective in this respect because it achieved the goal of making people feel safer. But also they may feel safer *because they think that after the installation of CCTV, crime rates in the parking area have decreased*, independent of whether they actually did or not. In this case, the increased feeling of safety may indicate that CCTV *is perceived* to be effective. So the feeling of safety can relate both to actual effectiveness, as a part of perceived security and to perceived effectiveness.
The picture below illustrates the overlap and interaction between the two aspects of effectiveness.



Actual and perceived effectiveness – Interaction and overlap

To sum up, although the distinction between perceived and actual effectiveness is methodologically useful and will be further employed in this paper, two caveats should be kept in mind: 1) despite what the expressions "perceived effectiveness" and "actual effectiveness" may suggest, perception issues are part of both actual and perceived effectiveness; 2) a clear distinction between the two is not always possible nor

authentically describes the complex role perception plays in matters related to effectiveness.

b) Perception aspects of effectiveness

As we have seen, the effectiveness of surveillance technologies encompasses also perception-related aspects: surveillance technologies are effective if they increase perceived security, i.e. if they increase feelings of safety or reduce fear of crime.
The matter is twofold: 1) on the one hand, it involves the direct relationship between surveillance and perceived security, i.e. the question whether surveillance, independent of its actual security improvements, increases perceived security; 2) on the other hand it refers to the relationship between actual and perceived security, i.e. to the question of whether an improvement in actual security brings about an increase in perceived security.
The two points are not identical, as it is not obvious that the deployment of surveillance technologies increases actual security. To tackle such matters is beyond the scope of this deliverable, so it will be enough here to quickly recall that the results of several studies challenged the assumption that surveillance improves actual security[61].

The fact that surveillance does not necessarily bring about an increase in actual security, and that perceived and actual security often do not overlap, opens up the possibility for what is called the "security theatre". This "covers measures taken, ostensibly in the name of security, whose value lies solely (or at least mostly) in their capacity to give the reassuring impression that *something is being done*, that *steps are being taken*, that *someone is on the case*—rather than in actually increasing security, considered from an objective standpoint. The role of security theatre is to increase *perceived* security, without necessarily having any positive effect in terms of *actual* security".[62]

1- Surveillance and perceived security

Does the deployment of surveillance technologies *per se* bring about an improvement in perceived security? Studies show little evidence for a casual relationship between the deployment of surveillance technologies and a reduction in fear of crime or an increase in security feelings.
A first group of studies found little evidence and limited change to have occurred after the installation of CCTV. The URBAN EYE report and a study carried out in the German

[61] B. C. Welsh, D. P. Farrington, Home Office Research Study 252, Crime prevention effects of closed circuit television: a systematic review, 2002, http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/video_surveillance/PDFs/Welsh&Farrington_2002.pdf, last access 25/7/2013; and M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, Home Office Research Study 292, 2005, https://www.cctvusergroup.com/downloads/file/Martin%20gill.pdf, last access 25/7/2013. However, less studies are available on this topic and the matter is complicated by the fact that there is no clear methodology for assessing the effectiveness of surveillance technologies. See SURVEILLE D3.4, Report Describing design of research methodology for assessing effectiveness, forthcoming.
[62] PACT D1.4 Societal Impact Report, cit., p. 16.

city of Regensburg, for instance, report that only a minority of those interviewed affirmed that they felt safer after the installation of CCTV. [63]

A second group of studies found that in some cases the installation of CCTV *negatively* influenced citizens' perceived security. In a study carried out in Glasgow, for instance, the percentage of those who said that they would avoid the city centre increased after the installation of CCTV[64]. The same studies found no evidence that, in general, the installation of CCTV in Glasgow had a positive impact on fear of crime. Also a study by Gill and Spriggs carried out in different cities in the UK found that, in general, little improvement in feelings of safety took place after the installation of CCTV. Moreover, in particular cases, an increase in the fear of crime was even registered: in two of the surveilled areas, people who were aware of the installation of CCTV worried more often about crime than those unaware of the CCTV. The authors interpret these findings as indicators that the presence of cameras can make a place appear less safe than one would have assumed[65]. We already referred to such phenomenon in section 2 as the "security dilemma".

Drawing from such studies and others, several authors pointed out that feelings of safety depend less on technical factors like the installation of a CCTV system and more on other elements like the actual reduction of victimization, familiarity with people, situations and place, and the presence of other people.[66]

2- Actual and perceived security

In the previous sub-section, we addressed the question of whether the deployment of surveillance technologies *per se* increases perceived security independent from the question of whether it also increases actual security. Now we shall assume that security technologies increase actual security and will ask whether, and if yes how, this impacts perceived security.

Intuitively, one could assume that perceived security is in a cause-effect relationship with actual security: the higher the factual crime reduction, the higher the safety feelings, and vice-versa. This is partly true and there are surveys that indicate the existence of a link between victimization (i.e. the experience of having been the victim of a crime) and the fear of crime. So, for instance, a study carried out in the UK found that people who had been the victim of a crime in the year before the interview were three times more likely to worry about crime than non-victims[67].

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[63] F. Helten, B. Fischer, Urban Eye WP 13, What do people think of CCTV, cit.; G. Klocke et al., Das Hintertürchen des Nichtwissens, Bürgerrechte & Polizei: CILIP, 69 (2001) 2, http://www.cilip.de/ausgabe/69/video.htm, last access 25/7/2013; Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung, cit., p. 77; M. Apelt, N. Möllers, Wie intelligente" Videoüberwachung, cit. See also Brown, B., CCTV in Town Centres: Three case studies, Police Research Group. Crime Detection and Prevention Series; Paper No. 68, 1995, http://www.popcenter.org/responses/video_surveillance/pdfs/brown_1995_full.pdf

[64] J. Ditton, Crime an the city , cit., p. 698; Avoidance behaviour, i.e. to avoid going to certain areas (at certain times) is considered in this and other surveys as a sign of lack of safety feeling: people avoid certain places if they do not feel safe there.

[65] M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit., p. 48. Such findings are confirmed in D. Williams, J. Ahmed, The Relationship Between, cit.

[66] M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit.; M. Apelt, N. Möllers, Wie intelligente" Videoüberwachung, cit; N. Zurawski, „It is all about perceptions', cit.

[67] M: M. Gill et al., Public perceptions, cit., p. 311

However, the relationship between fear of crime and reduction of crime is not always so direct as the above-mentioned findings would suggest[68]. On the contrary, often the objective situation and the subjective feeling do not appear correlated: crime rates may increase and the fear of crime may decrease, and vice versa. To describe such phenomenon scholars speak of the "fear of crime paradox".

This might derive from a misevaluation of the risks related to criminality, which in turn may be influenced by several factors. First, people may have an unrealistic perception of how likely it is that they become the victim of a crime (false perception of "personal risk"). For instance, statistics often report that women are more afraid of becoming victims of violence, although in fact men are far more often victims of violence than women[69]. Second, people may misperceive the likelihood of a particular crime of being committed in general or in a particular situation (false perception of "situational risk"). Parents, for instance, are increasingly worried about children becoming victims of sexual assault, although the number of cases is decreasing, or women are more afraid of sexual violence in public spaces, although statistics show that two thirds of the cases of sexual violence take place at home or inside the family[70].

Explanations for such a paradox range from sociological, to psychological, to evolutionistic and mixed models[71].

Although there are many studies on the relationship between actual risk and risk perception, very little can be found dealing specifically with surveillance technologies. Apart from the study already mentioned by Gill and Spriggs, we found no survey measuring the impact of a surveillance system on actual security and on perceived security and comparing the two. A study carried out in the CPSI project, however, indirectly tackles the matter[72]. It investigated, among others, the relationship between acceptance of security interventions by the state and perceived security in seven European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and, against expectations, it uncovered no evidence of the existence of such relationship. Moreover, the authors argued that political and cultural factors also played a role in shaping the relationship between actual and perceived security. On this basis they interpreted the main findings of the surveys. These included

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[68] S. for instance H-J. Lange, M. Gasch, "Subjektives Sicherheitsgefühl", Wörterbuch zur inneren Sicherheit, Wiesbaden, 2006, p. 323.

[69] S. for instance SuSi-PLUS, Subjektives Sicherheitsempfinden im Personennahverkehr mit Linienbusse, U-Bahnen und Stadtbahnen, Auszug aus dem Abschlussbericht: Zusammenfassung und wichtigste Ergebnisse, http://www.susi-team.de/images/stories/Downloads/band7summary.pdf, 2005, last access 25/7/2013, p. 11-12 and the UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) statistical database at http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/database/STAT/30-GE/07-CV/?lang=1.

[70] M. Apelt, N. Möllers, Wie „intelligente" Videoüberwachung, cit., p. 588.

[71] Ivi; H-J. Lange, M. Gasch, "Subjektives Sicherheitsgefühl", cit.; B. Schneier, The Psychology of Security, 2008, http://www.schneier.com/essay-155.html, visited on 20th June 2013; S. Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, M. Peterson (Eds.), The Handbook of Risk Theory, part 4; K. Boers, P. Kurz, Kriminalitätseinstellungen, soziale Milieus und sozialer Umbruch, in K. Boers, G. Gutsche, K. Sessar (eds.), Sozialer Umbruch und Kriminalität in Deutschland, Opladen, 1997, 187-254; D., Die Entwicklung von Kriminalität und Kriminalitätsfurcht in Deutschland – Konsequenzen für die Kriminalprävention, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kommunalwissenschaften, 42 (2003), 1, 31-52.

[72] CPSI Analytical Standpoint 13, Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies, 2010, http://www.esci.at/eusipo/asp13.pdf, last access 25/7/2013.

uncovering discrepancies between criminal statistics and the level of fear of crime. So, for instance, the study registered a social "overfear" of crime in Austria and an "underfear" security culture in Germany; i.e. that, according to the study, in Austria people are more fearful about crimes being committed than a realistic consideration of statistics on crime would suggest; while in Germany the fear of crime is low compared to actual crime rates.

c) Perceived effectiveness

The question to be addressed here is: do people think surveillance is effective, typically in reducing crime and reducing the fear of crime?

Surveys generally report a high acceptance of CCTV systems, so it is somehow puzzling to find out that, as the same studies show, most people do not think of CCTV as effective. The PRISE deliverable 5.8 reports that: "approximately 70 per cent of the participants in the six countries completely or partly agree to the statement that many security technologies do not really increase security, but are only being applied to show that something is being done to fight terror. The technologies are simply implemented for political reasons".[73] Studies carried out in the URBAN EYE project and in the city of Hamburg confirmed such scepticism with reference to CCTV[74]. The former study reports that 55% of respondents agree with the statement that CCTV "displaces rather than reduces" crime; only 23% believed that it "prevents serious crime" and only 29% affirmed that they would feel safer if more CCTV systems were installed. Similar results were found in Hamburg: almost 60% of respondents believed that CCTV displaces crime instead of solving it, while only 43% felt that cameras protect them against crime.

Other studies registered that people's belief in the effectiveness of CCTV declined after their installation. A study conducted by Gill and Spriggs in the UK, for instance, asked people in residential areas before and after CCTV installation whether they thought that: a) people are more likely to report incidents to the police when CCTV is present; b) the police respond more quickly if CCTV is installed and c) crime decrease after the installation of CCTV. In all cases, people were less prone to agree with such statements after CCTV was installed[75]. These and similar results from other studies have been interpreted as a consequence of a more realistic attitude towards CCTV after seeing them in action: "It was not as good as they thought it would be; it was not responsible, as far as they could assess, for tackling crime[76].

However, contrary to the findings of the above-mentioned surveys, one of the available studies reports that a majority of people believed that CCTV is a meaningful tool to reduce criminality[77].

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[73] PRISE D5.8, cit., p. 22.

[74] Urban Eye WP 15, cit., p. 9, 13, 17 and p. 45; N. Zurawski, "It is all about perceptions"', cit., p. 269.

[75] M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit., p. ix-x and 57.

[76] M. Gill et al., Public perceptions, cit., p. 322.

[77] K-H. Reuband, Videoüberwachung. Was Bürger von der Überwachung halten, Neue Kriminalpolitik, 13 (2001), 2, 5-9, p. 9. According to these studies, among the perceived aims of the deployment of CCTV are both to catch offenders and to deter potential criminals.

4. Conclusions and a glimpse on the state of the art

The following conclusions emerge form the survey of European studies on perception.

First, a negative perception of surveillance in Europe is a very context-dependent issue. Places and situations where they are deployed and national differences play a major role in shaping the perception of such technologies.

Second, to the relationship between perception and effectiveness, it emerges from the studies presented here that this is a complex relationship, with no cause-consequence link between the two.

Beyond the results presented in the previous sections, the following observations on the state of the art of European studies on perception can be made on the basis of the research conducted for this Deliverable.

They regard the relationship between the groups targeted by surveillance and the sample represented in the interviews.
Depending on which technologies and to what purpose they are deployed, specific groups of people are more affected than others by surveillance. This is the case, for instance with CCTV, which is most commonly deployed to address "undesired" behaviours that have little to do with (serious) crime and terrorism. With the words of Martin Gill, CCTV, for instance, is used "extensively as a means of controlling alcohol-related and other anti-social behaviour in town and city centres, monitoring and dispersing large groups of individuals, and moving on what many operators termed 'undesirables', such as beggars and on-street traders" [78]. Another example is technologies used for border-control, mainly deployed for keeping away another category of "undesirables", i.e. migrants. According to the EUROPOL SOCTA ("Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment") 2013, to combat facilitation of illegal migration should be the top priority of the EUROPOL work, coming even before the fight against other activities whose criminal character is more apparent like human trafficking or money laundering. Moreover, surveillance's impact on migrants is huge not only because they are the first targets of European common security politics, but also because they are affected in a way that often goes so far as taking their lives[79]. Further examples are surveillance technologies for which targets are selected on the basis of a risk-profiling based on, for instance, their physical appearance (visual surveillance), their physical constitution (body scanners), or their behaviour when surfing on the internet (communication surveillance).

[78] M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit., p. 117. See also L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, The Surveillance Consensus, cit.; L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit.; K-H. Reuband, Videoüberwachung, cit.; B. Brown, CCTV in Town Centres, cit., p. 40 and s. Graham et al., Towns on the Television, cit., p. 18.
[79] See http://fortresseurope.blogspot.de/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-frontiers-of-europe_16.html and the Judgement of the European Courts of Human Rights Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, 23.02.2012, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx#{%22display%22:[%221%22],%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22901572%22]}, both last visited 09/7/2013.

The question arises whether existing studies elaborate strategies for recruiting interviewees that could reflect such circumstances, i.e. to adequately represent in their results the views of those who are most affected by surveillance.
The table in Annex 3 shows the recruitment strategy for the 15 studies which based their conclusions on self-conducted surveys instead of relying on pre-existing ones.
Nine out of 15 studies used recruitment strategies or interview-media that indirectly excluded those most often targeted by surveillance, such as beggars, homeless, alcohol and drug addicts, and undocumented migrants or migrants who did not manage to become residents in the EU. Seven of these nine studies (marked in light green in Annex 3) excluded non-resident persons (therefore homeless, undocumented migrants and migrants who attempted to come to Europe but failed) from their sample either because of addressing only residents or because typically using media to approach those sampled implied residence (landline phone and mail)[80]. The remaining two (marked in dark green in Annex 3) specifically targeted, at least as a part of the sample, students, thus also contributing to over-represent particular, non-deviant and non-marginal groups.
Six studies remain (marked in yellow in Annex 3), which approached people in publicly accessible spaces such as streets, public transport means and shopping areas and which may have also included in their sample so-called marginal or deviant people. In fact, one of them reports on three self-reportedly homeless people taking part in the interview[81]. None of these studies, however, tried actively to select their sample in a way that is representative of the people most targeted by surveillance[82].

Since almost all the 15 studies, with the only exception of two, refer exclusively to visual surveillance, typically to CCTV, the following observations will refer to this kind of surveillance. As far as visual surveillance through CCTV is concerned, we may conclude that the perception of surveillance by its privileged targets is underrepresented and that they mostly assume an "internal" point of view with regard to the society and to Europe.
Consequently, there is a need to conduct surveys that give due weight to the points of view of those who are mostly affected by surveillance such as beggars, street-traders, alcoholics.

It remains to verify if such conclusions apply also to other surveillance areas, but this is a task for another day

[80] Three of them (the PRISE studies and EUROBAROMETER 225) in addition to the main approach by mail also recruited their sample through media that do not necessarily exclude "marginal" people such as advertising in newspapers and personal contact. However, such changes were adopted not as a rule and not in order to compensate for the possible underrepresentation of "marginal", in this case homeless people.
[81] N. Zurawski, „It is all about perceptions', cit.
[82] The two studies from the URBAN EYE project also conducted "in depth" inteviews with "marginalised" persons and "deviants". However, this did not influence the results of their "quantitative" surveys.

5. Literature

A) Books and articles

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B) Surveys and metastudies

See Annex 2

Annex 1: Table of effects and side effects of surveillance



Annex 2: list of studies on the perception of surveillance used in the Deliverable

Year	Project/author	Title	Publication place	P	NP	E/ SE	P& E	Type of surveillance
1999	S. Graham et al.	Towns on the Television: Closed Circuit TV Surveillance in British towns and cities	http://www.ncl.ac.uk/			✓		Visual
2000	J. Ditton	Crime an the city. Public Attitudes towards Open-Street CCTV in Glasgow	The British Journal of Criminology, 40 (2000) 4, 692-709			✓	✓	Visual
2001	G. Klocke et al.	Das Hintertürchen des Nichtwissens	Bürgerrechte & Polizei: CILIP, 69 (2001) 2, http://www.cilip.de				✓	Visual
2001	K-H. Reuband	Videoüberwachung. Was Bürger von der Überwachung halten	Neue Kriminalpolitik, 13 (2001), 2, 5-9				✓	Visual
2002	B. C. Welsh, D. P. Farrington	Home Office Research Study 252, Crime prevention effects of closed circuit television: a systematic review	http://www.popcenter.org/				✓	Visual
2004	URBAN EYE	WP 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report	http://www.urbaneye.net/		✓	✓		Visual
2004	URBAN EYE	WP 13, What do people think of CCTV. Findings from a Berlin Survey	http://www.urbaneye.net/			✓	✓	Visual
2005	M. Gill, A. Spriggs	Assessing the impact of CCTV, Home Office Research Study 292	https://www.cctvusergroup.com/				✓	Visual
2005	C. Ketzer	Securitas ex Machina. Von der Bedeutung technischer Kontroll- und Überwachungssysteme für Gesellschaft	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de			✓		Visual

		und Pädagogik						
2006	NG-Kruelle et al.	Biometrics and e-identity (e-passport) in the European Union: End-user perspectives on the adoption of a controversial innovation	Journal of Theoretical and Applied Commerce Research, 1 (2006), 2, 12-35 http://www.jtaer.com/			✓		Biometrics
2006	Chen-Yu Lin	Öffentliche Videoüberwachung in den USA, Großbritannien und Deutschland – Ein Drei-Länder-Vergleich	http://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/			✓	✓	Visual
2006	EPTA	ICT and Privacy in Europe. Experiences from technology assessment of ICT and Privacy in seven different European countries	http://www.ta-swiss.ch			✓		Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location
2007	M. Gill et al.	Public perceptions of CCTV in residential areas : "It is not as good as we thought it would be"	International Criminal Justice Review 17(2007), 304-324			✓	✓	Visual
2008	Gallup Organization	EUROBAROMETER 225 – Data Protection in the European Union. Citizens' perceptions	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm		✓			Data
2008	V. Pavone, M. Pereira	The privacy Vs security dilemma in a risk society. Insights from the PRISE project on the public perception of new security technologies in Spain	http://www.wiscnetwork.org			✓		Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location Sensors
2008	PRISE	D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security Technology and Privacy	http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/			✓	✓	Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location

								Sensors
2009	D. Williams, J. Ahmed	The Relationship Between Antisocial Stereotypes and Public CCTV Systems: Exploring Fear of Crime in the Modern Surveillance Society	https://uhra.herts.ac.uk			✓	✓	Visual
2009	L. Hempel, E. Töpfer	The Surveillance Consensus : Reviewing the Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries	European Journal of Criminology, 6 (2009), 2, 157-177			✓	✓	Visual
2010	A. T. O' Donnel et al.	Who is watching over you? The role of shared identity in perceptions of surveillance	European Journal of Social Psychology, 40 (2010), 135–147	✓				Visual
2010	N. Zurawski	'It is all about perceptions': CCTV, feelings of safety and perceptions of space - what the people say	Security Journal, 23 (2010), 259-275			✓	✓	Visual
2010	CPSI	Analytical Standpoint 13, Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies	http://www.esci.at				✓	
2011	C. Bozzoli, C. Müller	Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK	European Journal of Political Economy, 27 (2011), 89-106	✓				
2011	W. Peissl et al.	Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen der Videoüberwachung	http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/			✓		Visual
2011	M. Apelt, N. Möllers	Wie intelligente" Videoüberwachung erforschen? Ein Resümee aus zehn Jahren Forschung zu Videoüberwachung	Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolit (2011), 4, 585–593			✓	✓	Visual
2012	PRESCIENT	D3, Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new and emerging technologies: Assessing citizens' concerns and knowledge of stored personal data	http://www.prescient-project.eu/	✓				Data
2012	SAPIENT	Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of the Art	http://www.sapientproject.eu	✓				Visual Biometrics Communication

								Data Location Sensors
2012	PACT	Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6	http://www.projectpact.eu/documents-1			✓		Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location Sensors
2012	PACT	D1.4 Societal Impact Report	http://www.projectpact.eu/			✓	✓	Visual Data
2013	PRISMS	D7.1: Report on Existing Surveys	http://prismsproject.eu	✓				Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location

P = Perception in general
NP = European Overview on negative perception
E/SE = Effect and side effects
P&E = Perception and effectiveness

Annex 3: Recruitment strategy of the studies

Year	Project/author	Title	Sample size	Recruitment strategy / Targeted people	Type of surveillance
1999	S. Graham et al.	Towns on the Television: Closed Circuit TV Surveillance in British towns and cities		Pre-existing studies	Visual
2000	J. Ditton	Crime an the city. Public Attitudes towards Open-Street CCTV in Glasgow	3.074	Street interviews with local residents	Visual
2001	G. Klocke et al.	Das Hintertürchen des Nichtwissens	120	Street interviews withresidents, randomly approached	Visual
2001	K-H. Reuband	Videoüberwachung. Was Bürger von der Überwachung halten	1.568	Mail. Adresses randomly selected from the residents' (18+) register	Visual
2002	B. C. Welsh, D. P. Farrington	Home Office Research Study 252, Crime prevention effects of closed circuit television: a systematic review		Pre-existing studies	Visual
2004	URBAN EYE	WP 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report	1.001 resp.	Street interviews	Visual
2004	URBAN EYE	WP 13, What do people think of CCTV. Findings from a Berlin Survey	203	Street interviews outside shopping malls	Visual
2005	M. Gill, A. Spriggs	Assessing the impact of CCTV, Home Office Research Study 292	13.104	s. Gill 2007	Visual
2005	C. Ketzer	Securitas ex Machina. Von der Bedeutung technischer Kontroll- und Überwachungssysteme für	12	Users of public transportation	Visual

		Gesellschaft und Pädagogik			
2006	NG-Kruelle et al.	Biometrics and e-identity (e-passport) in the European Union: End-user perspectives on the adoption of a controversial innovation	269	Internet survey with EU-citizens: MBA students	Biometrics
2006	Chen-Yu Lin	Öffentliche Videoüberwachung in den USA, Großbritannien und Deutschland – Ein Drei-Länder-Vergleich		Pre-existing studies	Visual
2006	EPTA	ICT and Privacy in Europe. Experiences from technology assessment of ICT and Privacy in seven different European countries		Pre-existing studies	Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location
2007	M. Gill et al.	Public perceptions of CCTV in residential areas : "It is not as good as we thought it would be"	9.121	In-home interviews with residents. Households selected through random sampling method	Visual
2008	Gallup Organization	EUROBAROMETER 225 – Data Protection in the European Union. Citizens' perceptions	27.000	Typically: Landline-telephone interviews. Also: personal interviews (15+)	Data
2008	V. Pavone, M. Pereira	The privacy Vs security dilemma in a risk society. Insights from the PRISE project on the public perception of new security technologies in Spain	25-35	Spanish citizens. For recruitment strategy s. PRISE D5.8.	Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location Sensors
2008	PRISE	D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security Technology and Privacy	158	Typically: invitation by mail for interview	Visual Biometrics

				meetings. Also: phone; advertising	Communication Data Location Sensors
2009	D. Williams, J. Ahmed	The Relationship Between Antisocial Stereotypes and Public CCTV Systems: Exploring Fear of Crime in the Modern Surveillance Society	120	Visitors of the central public shopping area. Randomly selected	Visual
2009	L. Hempel, E. Töpfer	The Surveillance Consensus : Reviewing the Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries		Existing studies	Visual
2010	A. T. O' Donnel et al.	Who is watching over you? The role of shared identity in perceptions of surveillance	251	Visitors of the city centre (16+) and students in a British University	Visual
2010	N. Zurawski	'It is all about perceptions': CCTV, feelings of safety and perceptions of space - what the people say	216	Visitors of the "amusement district" in the city centre. Random approach (3 homeless)	Visual
2010	CPSI	Analytical Standpoint 13, Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies		Pre-existing surveys	
2011	C. Bozzoli, C. Müller	Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK		Pre- existing surveys	
2011	W. Peissl et al.	Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen der Videoüberwachung		Pre- existing surveys	Visual
2011	M. Apelt, N. Möllers	Wie intelligente" Videoüberwachung erforschen? Ein Resümee aus zehn Jahren Forschung zu Videoüberwachung		Pre- existing surveys	Visual
2012	PRESCIENT	D3, Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new and emerging technologies: Assessing citizens' concerns and knowledge of stored personal data		Pre- existing surveys	Data

2012	SAPIENT	Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of the Art		Pre- existing surveys	Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location Sensors
2012	PACT	Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6		Pre- existing surveys	Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location Sensors
2012	PACT	D1.4 Societal Impact Report		Pre- existing surveys	Visual Data
2013	PRISMS	D7.1: Report on Existing Surveys		Pre- existing surveys	Visual Biometrics Communication Data Location

Annex 4: List of FP6 and FP7 projects relevant for issues on surveillance perceptions

FP6

- BITE - Biometric Identification Technologies Ethics, http://www.biteproject.org
- HUMABIO - Human monitoring and authentication using biodynamic indicators and behavioural analysis, www.humabio-eu.org

FP 7

- CPSI - Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions, www. cpsi-fp7.eu
- DETECTER - Detection Technologies, Terrorism, Ethics, and Human Rights, http://www.detecter.eu/
- HIDE- Homeland Security, Biometric Identification & Personal Detection Ethics, http://www.hideproject.org/
- IRISS - Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies, http://irissproject.eu/
- PACT - Public perception of security and privacy: Assessing knowledge, Collecting evidence, Translating research into action, http://www.projectpact.eu/
- PRACTIS - Privacy – Appraising Challenges to Technologies and Ethics, www.practis.org
- PRISE - Privacy enhancing shaping of security research and technology – A participatory approach to develop acceptable and accepted principles for European Security Industries and Policies, http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/.
- PRISMS - The PRIvacy and Security MirrorS: Towards a European framework for integrated decision making, http://prismsproject.eu/
- RESPECT - Rules, Expectations & Security through Privacy-Enhanced Convenient Technologies, http://respectproject.eu/
- RISE - Rising Pan European & International Awareness of Biometrics & Security Ethics. For details see the project's website: http://www.riseproject.eu/
- SAPIENT - Supporting fundamental rights, Privacy and Ethics in Surveillance

Technologies, http://www.sapientproject.eu/

- SMART – Scalable Measures for Automated Recognition Technologies, http://www.smartsurveillance.eu/

- SurPRISE - Surveillance, Privacy and Security. A large scale participatory assessment of criteria and factors determining acceptability and acceptance of security technologies i